s t ).
A contract δ:= (ω(h t )) ∞ t=1 .
For any δ and any history h t , the net future benefit to the worker and the firm are:
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts -p. 4
Definitions s := state that occurs at date t h t = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . s t ).
δ is efficient if there exists no other self-enforcing contract which offers both parties at least as much expected utility and one party strictly more.
An optimal contract is an efficient contract which distributes the gains from the contract between the firm and the worker according to the market situation at date t = 0.
Optimum Contracts Let U t s be a feasible value of the worker's net future utility.
The Pareto-frontier is given by:
subject to:
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts -p. 5
Getting to a Solution
FOCs and Envelope Condition:
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts -p. 6
The Wage Process
So the wage depends only on the current spot market wage and the contract wage in the previous period.
The interval end-points corresponds to giving the worker and firm a zero gain starting from state q.
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts -p. 7
The interval end-points corresponds to giving the worker and firm a zero gain starting
